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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of Case.
This is an action for medical malpractice brought by Vaughn Schmechel, Robert P. Lewis,

Kim Howard and Tamara Hall (collectively referred to as "plaintiffs") against Thomas Byrne, P.A.
("Mr. Byrne"), Clinton Dille, M.D. ("Dr. Dille"), and the Southern Idaho Pain Institute ("SIP!")
(collectively referred to as "defendants"), rising out of the care and treatment provided to Rosalie
Schmechel between September 26, 2003 through October 2, 2003. Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Dille
and Mr. Byrne breached their standards of care in treating Mrs. Schmechel, including altering her
pain medication regimen, which they allege resulted in Mrs. Schmechel's death on October 2, 2003.
A jury trial commenced on October 16, 2007, and on October 30, 2007, the jury returned a
unanimous verdict in favor of Mr. Byrne, Dr. Dille and SIP!, concluding that neither Mr. Byrne nor
Dr. Dille breached the applicable standard of care in the treatment of Mrs. Schmechel. Appellants
filed a Motion for New Trial, which was denied by the Trial Court's January 23, 2008,
Memorandum Decision and Order. (R. Vol. III, pp. 531-545).

B.

Statement of Facts
Rosalie Schmechel was treated at the Southern Idaho Pain Institute beginning on September

26, 2003, relating to complaints of chronic severe back and leg pain. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1252, IL 14-20;
p. 1269, IL 6-25). Prior to her visit to SIPI in September 2003, Mrs. Schmechel had seen several
medical providers for her chronic low back and right leg pain she had experienced for over twenty
years.
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Kimberly Vorse, M.D. ("Dr. Vorse") began treating Mrs. Schmechel for lower back and right
leg pain in October 1996. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 507, II. 3-8). Dr. Vorse also treated Mrs. Schmechel for
sleep apnea. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 510, IL 9-17). Mrs. Schmechel saw Dr. Vorse roughly once a month
from October 1996 through September 2003. (Id.). In 1999, Dr. Vorse began treating Mrs.
Schmechel' s pain with OxyContin (a long acting Schedule II narcotic) and hydrocodone for break
through pain, which continued in various doses until September 2003. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 517-519, IL 55). Mrs. Schmechel last saw Dr. Vorse on September 16, 2003. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 518-519, II. 4-5).
On this last visit, Dr. Vorse increased Mrs. Schmechel's dosage ofOxyContin based upon Mrs.
Schmechel's complaints of worsening back pain. (Id.).
Dr. Vorse's practice was located in Sun Valley, Idaho. In September 2003, Mrs. Schmechel
determined she wanted to find a pain management provider closer to her home in Twin Falls. (Tr.
Vol. I, p. 870, 11. 4-17). Mrs. Schmechel's primary care provider, Ken Harris, M.D. ("Dr. Harris"),
referred her to the Southern Idaho Pain Institute for her pain management. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1252, II.
14-20).
Dr. Dille started SIP! in 1997 in Twin Falls, Idaho. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1375-1376, IL 14-9). SIP!
offers pain management care to a variety of patients. (Id.). In 2001, Dr. Dille hired Mr. Byrne to
work as a physician assistant at SIP!. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1381, IL 1-8). A physician assistant is a midlevel practitioner who has undergone 24 to 28 months of academic and clinical training in the
medical field, who works with and under the supervision of a physician. Physician assistants
examine patients, treat patients, perform minor procedures, prescribe medications, and treat a
number of illnesses. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1227-1239, II. 5-9). By September 2003, Dr. Dille and Mr.

Byrne had worked together for almost two years. During that time, Mr. Byrne's practice was
focused almost entirely on pain management and he had obtained considerable experience in
prescribing OxyContin, Hydrocodone, Methadone and other pain relieving medications. (Tr. Vol. II,
pp. 1387-1389, II. 5).
On her initial visit to SIPI on Friday, September 26, 2003, Mrs. Schmechel met with and was
evaluated by Mr. Byrne with respect to her pain issues. Mr. Byrne was a physician assistant at SIPI
who worked under the supervision of Dr. Dille. (Tr. Vol II, pp. 1247-1248, II. 9-24).

Mr. Byrne

met with Mrs. Schmechel on September 26, 2003 for over an hour. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1254, II. 18-23).
During this time Mr. Byrne performed an examination of Mrs. Schmechel and the two had a lengthy
discussion about her "past medical history, the medications that she took, her previous surgeries and,
most importantly, her current pain status and the concerns that she had about her ongoing pain and
her medications." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1255, II. 5-21). Mrs. Schmechel also provided SIPl with a form
she had previously filled out which indicated her medical history, current medications, a description
of her complaints, and social history. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1255-1262). Mr. Byrne and Mrs. Schmechel
went through the form during her September 26, 2003 visit. (Tr. Vol II, p. 1263, II. 9-14).

Mr.

Byrne learned that Mrs. Schmechel began to experience back pain in 1989 with subsequent lumbar
spine surgeries. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1257-1258, II. 18-4). Mr. Byrne also learned Mrs. Schmechel had
obstructive sleep apnea that had been managed by Dr. Vorse, and that Mrs. Schmechel was on CPAP
therapy. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1280, II. 8-20). Mrs. Schmechel described her current medications to Mr.
Byrne to include OxyContin 20 mg every eight hours and five to six Lortab 7.5/500 per day. (Tr.
Vol. II, p. 1266, II. 10-22).

Based upon Mrs. Schmechel' s connnents during the course of the September 26, 2003 visit
and Mr. Byrne's examination, it was clear to Mr. Byrne that Mrs. Schmechel was not being well
served by her existing pain management program, and that despite the recent increase in the dosage
of her OxyContin, she was struggling with her pain, which was affecting her daily life activities.
(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1286-1287, II. 12-6). In fact, Mrs. Schmechel indicated on her pain questionnaire
that she was experiencing 10 out of 10 pain. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1276, 11. 11-17). After completing a
history and physical examination of Mrs. Schmechel, Mr. Byrne also obtained a recent MRI taken of
Mrs. Schmechel from Magic Valley, that substantiated the nature and cause of her back pain and
indicated the back pain could not be alleviated by surgical means. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1270, II. 11-24; p.
1284, II. 10-15).
Mrs. Schmechel indicated to Mr. Byrne that she felt her current medications were not
working as well as they should, or as well as they had previously worked. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1289, ll. 315), Mr. Byrne talked with Mrs. Schmechel about the fact that sometimes after a person has been
taking the same medication for a significant period of time, switching to a different pain medication
may improve their pain level. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1289, II. 3-15). Mr. Byrne then reconnnended
Methadone to Mrs. Schmechel, and talked with her about how Methadone slowly builds up in your
system to provide Jong-acting pain relief for people who suffer from chronic unrelenting pain. (Tr.
Vol. II, pp. 1290-1291, II. 17- 16). Methadone, like OxyContin, is a Jong acting opioid analgesic
classified as a Schedule II narcotic. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1468, II. 4-14). Methadone, like OxyContin, is a
connnonly and widely used pain relief medication. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1679-1680, IL 15-3). Mr. Byrne
discussed the risks of Methadone with Mrs. Schmechel, including that the medication stays in your

system for a long period of time and can cause respiratory depression and potentially death. (Tr.
Vol. II, pp. 1291-1292, IL 17-14).
Based upon the history obtained from Mrs. Schmechel, his physical examination of Mrs.
Schmechel, and his lengthy discussion with Mrs. Schmechel regarding her pain, Mr. Byrne devised a
pain management plan in which he discontinued OxyContin and started Mrs. Schmechel on a
different class II narcotic, Methadone. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1297-1299, II. 20-11). The plan established
by Mr. Byrne called for Mrs. Schmechel to start "on Methadone IO mg q. 12h. titrated dose from 5
mg up to a maximum of 15 mg over the next 72 hours depending on its benefit." (Tr. Vol. II, pp.
1298, II. 19-23). Further, Mr. Byrne prescribed Hydrocodone 101500mg every 4-6 hours for break
through pain, and instructed Mrs. Schmechel to remain on Bextra and to decrease her Amitriptyline /
to 50-100 mg per day. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1298-1299, II. 24-2).
Relying on his training, education and experience, Mr. Byrne determined a conservative "
conversion dose ofOxyContin to Methadone to be 30 milligrams per day. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 12941295, II. 13-7). However, in an effort to avoid any undue side effects such as nausea, vomiting or
constipation, Mr. Byrne started Mrs. Schmechel on 5 mg of Methadone two times per day and then
gradually increased the amount of Methadone over the course of the next couple of days up to her
conversion dose amount of30 mg a day. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1295-1296, II. 8-10).
Mr. Byrne provided Mrs. Schmechel with prescriptions for the new medications and
instructed her to come back to the clinic within two weeks to see Dr. Dille. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 13021303, II. 11-1 ). Mr. Byrne called Mrs. Schmechel on Sunday evening, September 28, 2003 to see
how she was doing. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1313, II. 4-14). Mrs. Schmechel told Mr. Byrne she was doing

well, without side effects, and that her pain although still present, was improving. (Id. at II. 15-19).
Mr. Byrne instructed Mrs. Schmechel to increase her Methadone dosage to 10 mgs two times per
day. (Id. pp. 1313-1314, IL 20-2). Mrs. Schmechel called Mr. Byrue on Monday afternoon,
September 29, 2003, indicating her pain was continuing to improve and Mr. Byrne told her she could
take between 10 and 15 mg of Methadone two times per day. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1319-1321, II. 19-16).
Mr. Byrue did not speak with Mrs. Schmechel again after September 29, 2003. (Tr. Vol. II, pp.
1326-1327, II. 23-2).
On Monday, September 29, 2003, Mr. Byrne discussed Mrs. Schmechel's case with Dr.
Dille, informing him that she had a history of chronic back pain, sleep apnea and that her medication
had been changed from OxyContin to Methadone. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1322, II. 4-17). Dr. Dille appr9ved
Mr. Byrne's treatment plan for Mrs. Schmechel. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1323, II. 1-13).
Mrs. Schmechel passed away at her home on the morning of October 2, 2003. The'Twin
Falls Coroner's Office gathered all of Mrs. Schmechel's medications. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 726-727, II.
23-6). It was determined that 17 of the 90 Methadone pills were missing. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 764, 11. 824; see also exhibit 14 (graphic pill count)). Pursuant to the initial instructions from Mr. Byrne, and
the phone conversations between Mr. Byrne and Mrs. Schmechel on September 28 and 29, Mrs.
Schmechel should have taken, at a maximum, only: one a pill (a IO mg pill split in half and taken
once in the morning and once in the evening) on September 26, 2003; one pill on September 27,
2008; one and one half pills on September 28; two to three pills on September 29; three pills on
September 30; and three pills on October I, 2003 for a total maximum of 12 ½ Methadone pills-not the 17 pills that were missing.

C.

Course of Relevant Proceedings
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on January 5, 2006, in the Fifth

Judicial District of the State of Idaho. (R. Vol. I, pp. 28-36). On March 2, 2006, the parties
submitted a Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning. (R. Vol. I, pp. 69-72). The Stipulation
required plaintiffs to disclose their experts 180 days prior to trial (April 19, 2007) and that
defendants would disclose their experts 120 days prior to trial (June 18, 2007). (Id.) Trial of this
matter began on October 16, 2007, in Twin Falls, Idaho. (R. Vol. I, pp. 73-74). On October 30,
2007, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of defendants, finding that neither Mr. Byrne
nor Dr. Dille had breached the standard of care. (R. Vol. III, pp. 443-447).

1.

Discovery and Disclosure of the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement
/

On October 4, 2007, defendants received a letter from plaintiffs' counsel indicating "[t]he
rules for Ii censure of physician's assistants in effect in 2003, 22.0 I .03, require a written Delegation
of Services Agreement ... Kindly supplement your response." (Supp.R. Vol. V, p. 944 ). Prior to
receiving the October 4, 2007 letter, counsel for Mr. Byrne was under the misimpression that the
relevant Delegation of Services Agreement ("DOS Agreement") had been produced at Mr. Byrne's
deposition on May 18, 2006. (Supp.R. Vol. VI, p. 1098, ,i 2). At the time, it was discovered that the
2004 DOS Agreement rather than the 2003 Agreement had been produced. Once Mr. Byrne's
counsel learned the 2003 Agreement had not been produced, a request was made to Mr. Byrne to
attempt to locate the 2003 DOS Agreement. (Id.). Mr. Byrne conducted a search of his records and
located a copy of the 2003 DOS Agreement within some of his records that were kept in storage.

(Supp.R. Vol. V, pp. 949-951; Supp.R. Vol. VI, p. 1098, ,r 2). The 2003 DOS Agreement was then
immediately produced to plaintiffs' counsel. (Supp.R. Vol. VI, p. 1098 ,r 2).
At trial, plaintiffs attempted to elicit testimony from their expert Stephen Lordon, M.D. ("Dr.
Lordon") as to the 2003 DOS Agreement. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 341). Defendants objected to plaintiffs'
experts providing any testimony regarding the 2003 DOS Agreement as plaintiffs failed to disclose,
at anytime, that their experts would offer any opinions regarding any DOS agreement, despite the
fact they had the 2004 DOS Agreement and the IDAPA§ 22.01.03.000 (2003) for review. (Id. at pp.
341-344).

The Court sustained the objection, and did not allow Dr. Lordon to testify as to any

undisclosed opinions regarding the 2003 or 2004 DOS Agreements. (Id.). Plaintiffs attempted to
elicit similar testimony from their expert James Keller, PA-C, and defendants objpcted. After close
inspection .of plaintiffs' expert disclosures and further argument of counsel, the Court again
,
precluded plaintiffs from eliciting the undisclosed opinions from their experts regarding any alleged
breaches of the DOS Agreements. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 420-421, II. 21-19). 1

2.

Disclosure of James Smith, M.D. Opinions re: Cause of Death

On June 18, 2007, Mr. Byrne filed his Disclosure of Expert Witnesses. (Supp.R. Vol. I, pp.
152-220). One of the experts identified in the June 18, 2007 disclosure was James Smith, M.D.
("Dr. Smith"). Specifically, the June 18, 2007 disclosure indicated Dr. Smith was a board-certified

1

Plaintiffs' opening brief appears to limit the instant appeal to the Trial Court's exclusion of
only Dr. Lordon's proposed testimony regarding the DOS Agreements. Therefore, plaintiffs
have waived this particular issue with regard to any of their other experts. Idaho Ap. R. 35(a)(6);
State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,263, 923 P.2d 966,970 (1996). Mr. Byrne addresses the Court's
similar exclusion of Mr. Keller's purported undisclosed DOS opinions only for purposes of
completeness.

physician specializing in cardiology and internal medicine who was anticipated to testify regarding
the subject matters of"applicable medical principals, causation and damages." (Supp.R. Vol. I, p.
173). The Disclosure went on to discuss the anticipated substance of Dr. Smith's testimony- "the
cause of Mrs. Schmechel' s death is uncertain and that another condition she had was just as, if not
more, likely to have caused her death than Methadone and/or Hydrocodone." (Supp.R. Vol. I, pp.
172-173).
On October 5, 2007, Mr. Byrne filed his Supplemental Disclosure of Expert Witnesses (R.
Vol. II, pp. 228-237). Mr. Byrne's October 5, 2007, Supplemental Disclosure of Expert Witnesses
updated the materials reviewed by a number of his experts, including Dr. Smith and also provided
the following opinions of Dr. Smith:

It is anticipated that Dr. Smith will testify that, on a more probable than not
basis, the likely cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death was a cardiac death, likely a fatal
dysrhythmia. He will testify that the dysrhythmia was caused By her underlying
cardiac and other co-morbid conditions.
In addition to relying on all materials previously identified in Mr. Byrne's
original Disclosure of Expert Witnesses related to Dr. Smith, and identified in this
supplemental disclosure, Dr. Smith relies on the deposition of Dr. Glen Groben,
M.D.; Dr. Groben's autopsy report and toxicology report; the deposition testimony of
Shaiyenne Anton and Coroner's records and notes, as well as those of the Sherriff s
office; death scene photographs, and descriptions of the death scene.
(R. Vol. II pp. 232-234).
Dr. Smith's supplemented expert opinion regarding causation was based on materials
received by Dr. Smith just prior to October 5, 2007, as discussed below, these materials were not
available for Dr. Smith until late September due to scheduling difficulties the parties had in getting
the deposition testimony of Glen Groben, M.D. ("Dr. Groben") and the Twin Falls County Deputy

nrC'<nr...... n--.r>-..T'T",ci nnTr.r.

n ___ n

Coroner, Shaiyenne Antonjka Shindle (Ms. Anton is referred to as both Ms. Shindle and Ms. Anton
as her name changed throughout the course of the litigation. (Hereinafter she will be referred to as
"Ms. Anton" unless directly quoted from transcript]). (R. Vol. II pp. 232-234). Ms. Anton's
deposition was taken on September 5, 2007. (Supp.R. Vol. VI, p. 1160). Mr. Byrne's counsel
received the transcript on September 24, 2007 (Supp.R. Vol. VI, p. 1103) and had it hand delivered
to Dr. Smith on September 26, 2007 (Supp.R. Vol VI, p. I 108).
Defendants faced difficulties in scheduling Ms. Anton's deposition.

Ms. Anton was

originally scheduled for deposition on July 10, 2007. (Supp.R. Vol. VI, pp. 1151-1153). On June 7,
2007, an assistant from plaintiffs' counsel's office called indicating plaintiffs' counsel was not
available for the July 10, 2007 deposition of Ms. Anton. (Supp.R. ~ol. VI, pp. 1155). Counsel for
Mr. Byrne attempted to obtain dates from plaintiffs' counsel to reschedule Ms. Anton's deposition in
late June 2007. (Supp.R. Vol. VI, p. 1157). Due to unavailability of Ms. Anton and Dennis
Chambers (another Twin Falls County Coroner who was to be deposed), Mr. Byrne was unable to
get another available date for Ms. Anton until September 5, 2007.
Prior to Dr. Smith's testimony at trial, plaintiffs objected to Dr. Smith testifying as to his
opinion that Mrs. Schmechel died as a result of a cardiac arrhythmia on a more likely than not basis,
as such opinion was not disclosed until October 5, 2007. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1570-1579). The Court
denied plaintiffs' objection and allowed Dr. Smith to testify regarding his causation opinions. (Id. at
pp. 1578-1579). The jury never reached the causation question on the verdict form because it
concluded the defendants did not breach the standard of care. (R. Vol. III, pp. 443-447).

3.

Idaho Department of Administrative Procedures Act Rules for the Licensure of
Physicians Assistants

At trial, plaintiffs moved to admit the Idaho Department of Administrative Procedures Act
regulations regarding physician assistants ("IDAPA Regulations") as an exhibit. (Tr. Vol. II., pp.
1344-1345, II. 3-13). Counsel for Mr. Byrne objected to the admission of the IDAPA Regulations on
the grounds that they were hearsay. (Id.) The Trial Court allowed plaintiffs' counsel to use the
IDAPA Regulations to question witnesses, but reserved its ruling on whether they would go to the
jury. (Id. at p. 1345, 11. 6-9). Ultimately, the Trial Court did not admit the IDAPA Regulations
(Exhibit 39), but allowed the parties to question witnesses and use the IDAP A Regulations in their
closing arguments. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1888-1889, II. 17-8).
During the course of trial, plaintiffs submitted theii First Supplemental Proposed Jury
Instructions, requesting a per se negligence instruction in relation to the IDAPA Regulations. (R.
Vol. II, pp. 336-345). Defendants filed their objections to such instructions on October 26, 2007.
(R. Vol. II, pp. 364-379). The Court did not give plaintiffs' Negligence Per Se Instruction, and
instead gave Instruction No. 28 which stated "You are instructed that the court takes judicial notice
of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, Section 22.01.03, 2003, entitled, Rules for the
Licensure of Physician Assistants. The Rules were in effect in 2003." (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1887-1888,
II. 21-16).

4.

Bifurcation of Recklessness from Negligence

During the course of trial, plaintiffs submitted their First Supplemental Proposed Jury
Instructions, which included an instruction on "reckless conduct." (R. Vol. II, p. 343). On October
19, 2007, plaintiffs submitted a Bench Brief Re: Proposed "Reckless" Jury Instruction. (R. Vol. II,

pp. 350-358). Defendants objected to the proposed reckless jury instruction and requested the Court
bifurcate the reckless issue until after the jury had made a decision as to negligence and damages as
discussed in Defendants' Joint Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions. (R. Vol. II, pp.
364-3 79). After hearing argument from counsel, the Court granted defendants' request to bifurcate
the reckless issue. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1883-1884, ll. 11-17).

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.

Whether The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Excluding Plaintiffs From Offering
Expert Testimony From Dr. Stephen Lordon Concerning The 2003 Delegation Of Services
Agreement;

2.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. James Smith to testify
regarding his causation opinions;

3.

Whether The District Court Erred In Not Admitting The IDAPA Regulations Or By Not
Giving A Negligence Per Se Instruction Based Upon The IDAPA Regulations; And

4.

Whether The District Court Erred In Bifurcatjrig The Reckless Issue.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR APPEAL OF A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The Idaho Supreme Court reviews a district court's decision to grant or deny a motion for
new trial "for an abuse of discretion and will not disturb that decision absent a manifest abuse ofthis
discretion." Johannsen v. Utterbeck, --- P.3d --- 2008 WL 459, 524, 8 Idaho 2008, *5, citing

Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 497-98, 943 P.2d 912, 323-924 (1997). "A trial court
does not abuse its discretion if it ( l) recognizes the issue as one of discretion, (2) acts within the
boundaries of its discretion and applies the applicable legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision
through an exercise of reason." In re Jane Doe, I, 145 Idaho 650, ---, 182 P.3d 707, 708 (2008);
citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.3d 993, 1000

(1991 ). For the reasons stated below, the Trial Court's decision denying plaintiffs' motion for new
trial was not in error, and was not a manifest abuse of discretion and the Trial Court's decision
should be affirmed.

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The Court Properly Precluded Plaintiffs' Expert Dr. Lordon From Offering Expert
Testimony Regarding The Delegation Of Services Agreement, As Plaintiffs Failed To
Disclose Such Opinions.
Plaintiffs argue the Trial Court abused its discretion in not allowing their experts to offer

opinions regarding the 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement based on the fact the 2003 DOS
Agreement was not produced until one week prior to trial. Specifically, plaintiffs argue the 2003
DOS Agreement was untimely produced, and that such late disclosure prohibited them from
/

addressing the DOS Agreement and alleged breaches thereof with their experts prior to trial and
from supplementing their expert disclosures.
However, as discussed below, plaintiffs' arguments fail for the following reasons: (1) the
2003 DOS Agreement was produced as soon as it was discovered; (2) plaintiffs could have avoided
any alleged unfair surprise by providing their experts with the information they did have (the earlier
produced 2004 DOS Agreement which was nearly identical to the 2003 DOS Agreement, 2001 Job
Description and IDAP A regulations) and disclosed whatever expert opinions they may have had as
to whether Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille's practice arrangement was within the standard of care; (3)
plaintiffs' experts offered opinions throughout the trial and their depositions indicating defendants'
actions did not breach Idaho laws; (4) Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille testified that the DOS Agreements
were not restrictive and allowed for Mr. Byrne to treat and care for Mrs. Schmechel; (5) plaintiffs

could have supplemented their experts' opinions after receiving the 2003 DOS Agreement and prior
to trial; and ( 6) plaintiffs had an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence regarding the 2003 DOS
Agreement but failed to do so and thereby waived their ability to argue such issue. Further, the Trial
Court was fully aware of the facts and circumstances surrounding this issue, recognized the decision
to allow plaintiffs' experts to testify regarding the 2003 DOS Agreement was one of discretion, and
decided to deny such testimony based upon a reasoned decision within its discretion and within
applicable legal standards. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1578-1579, II. 15-20).

l.

The Standard of Review

The admissibility of expert testimony is an issue within the discretion of the trial court and
cannot be overturned unless there has been an abuse of that discretion. Clark v. Klein, 13 7 Idaho
/

154, 45 P.3d 810 (2002).

2.

The 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement was Produced as Soon as it was
Discovered

Mr. Byrne's counsel was under the misimpression that the relevant DOS Agreement had
been produced at Mr. Byrne's May 18, 2006 deposition. (Supp.R. Vol. VI, p. 1098,

,r 2).

On

October 4, 2007, defendants received a letter from plaintiffs' counsel indicating a DOS Agreement
was required in 2003, and to "kindly supplement your response." (Supp.R. Vol. V, p. 944). After
receiving this letter, counsel for Mr. Byrne realized that at Mr. Byrne's May 18, 2006 deposition, a
copy of the 2004 DOS Agreement (not the 2003 Agreement) was produced. (Supp.R. Vol. VI, p.
1098 ,r 2). Counsel for Mr. Byrne asked Mr. Byrne if he could search his records for a copy of a
2003 DOS Agreement. (Id.). Mr. Byrne conducted a search of his records that were kept in storage
and discovered the 2003 DOS Agreement and provided it to counsel, who then immediately

produced the document to plaintiffs' counsel on October 10, 2007. (Supp.R.Vol. V, pp. 949-951).
As such, plaintiffs had almost a week to supplement their disclosure of expert witnesses with respect
to the 2003 DOS Agreement, but did not do so.

3.

The 2003 and 2004 Delegation of Services Agreements are Nearly Identical

Plaintiffs argue they were precluded from providing the 2003 DOS Agreement to their
experts to allow them to review the records and supplement their disclosures prior to trial. However,
plaintiffs had been provided the 2004 DOS Agreement, the 2001 Job Description and the IDAPA
regulations regarding physician assistants. As such, they could have provided those documents to
their experts for purposes of disclosing opinions as to whether Mr. Byrne or Dr. Dille acted outside
the scope of their authority in providing care and treatment to Mrs. Schmechel; however, plaintiffs
/

failed to do so. A review of the 2003 and 2004 DOS Agreements reveals they are nearly identical. 2

2

The 2003 DOS Agreement (Ex. 40) and the 2004 DOS Agreement vary in only very minor and
insignificant ways which are described in large part below with the changes underscored:
-The first sentence of the paragraph under heading Re-Evaluation:
o 2003 Agreement states: "The PA will be utilized in the re-evaluation of existing
patients for medication management, prescription renewal and recommendations
for further treatment within our facility."
o 2004 Agreement states: "The PA will be utilized in the re-evaluation of existing
patients for medication management & renewal and recommendations for further
treatment within our facility."
-The second sentence of the paragraph under the heading of Minor Procedures:
o 2003 Agreement States: "These include but are not limited to: trigger point
injections, small joint injections, occipital injections, and laceration repair.
o 2004 Agreement states: "These include but are not limited to: trigger point
injections, small joint injections, occipital injections, and manipulations."
-The third paragraph under the heading "Prescription Authority":

(Supp.R. Vol. V, pp. 954-956; Supp.R. Vol. 6, pp. 1208-1210). Significantly, with respect to the
portions of the 2003 Agreement from which plaintiffs primarily questioned Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille,
"Initial Evaluation of Patients," the Agreements were identical. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 783-791 ); Tr. Vol. II,
pp. 1346-1350). Those sections state:
The physician assistant employed with Southern Idaho Pain and Rehabilitation will
be utilized in the initial evaluation for patients seen in this facility. These patients
stem from a physician referral base and also patient self-referrals. Patients will
require a full history and physical on initial visit. Pertinent findings will be
documented and recommendations made. The recommendations will be reviewed by
the supervising physician to confirm findings and determine a treatment plan.
(Supp.R. Vol. V, pp. 954-956; Supp.R. Vol. 6, pp. 1208-1210).
Plaintiffs were provided the 2004 DOS Agreement and the 2001 Job Description on May 18,
/

2006. (Supp.R. Vol. V, p. 880). Plaintiffs could have provided the 2004 DOS Agreement to their
experts along with the 200 l Job Description and the IDAPA regulations for purposes of forming
opinions regarding the same. However, plaintiffs did not provide the 2004 DOS Agreement nor the
2001 job description to their experts for their consideration until some time around October 5, 2007.
(Supp.R. Vol. I, pp. 23-43; R. Vol. II, pp. 238-242).

o

o

2003 Agreement states: "Current prescribing privileges, now include Schedule 2,
2N, 3, 3N, 4 and 5, after application and approval through the Idaho Board of
Medicine and Federal Drug Enforcement Administration Guidelines."
2004 Agreement states: "Current prescribing privileges, now include Schedule 2,
2N, 3, 3N, 4 and 5. This change came after application and approval through the
Idaho Board of Medicine and Federal Drug Enforcement Administration
guidelines."

4.

Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille Testified Mr. Byrne acted Within the Allowable Scope
of the DOS Agreement in Treating Mrs. Schmechel

Plaintiffs argue that the 2003 DOS Agreement placed certain restrictions on Mr. Byrne's
ability to care for and treat Mrs. Schrnechel, and that their experts were prepared to testify Mr.
Byrne's care and treatment of Mrs. Schrnechel exceeded these restrictions and violated the 2003
DOS Agreement. Plaintiffs' argument is in error as both Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille testified that Mr.
Byrne's care and treatment of Mrs. Schrnechel was allowed by the DOS Agreement.
Plaintiffs allege the 2003 DOS Agreement required "Mr. Byrne to make only
recommendations of a treatment plan to Dr. Dille." (Appellants' Brief, p. 16). Plaintiffs further
argue the 2003 DOS Agreement required Dr. Dille, and not Mr. Byrne, determine a treatment plan.
Plaintiffs assert that their experts were prepared to testify that these two elements or requirements of
the 2003 DOS Agreement were breached by Mr. Byrne.
However, as testified to by both Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille, the 2003 DOS Agreement was a
"working agreement between the - the supervising physician and the physician assistant that
establishes the ground rules for our practice together; and it's a dynamic process again, as we learn
and work together ... and treat patients." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1250, II. 9-21). Dr. Dille testified as
follows regarding the DOS Agreement:
Our intent was to allow Mr. Byrne to practice medicine and to do the things that he
had been trained for and was obviously authorized to perform by the State of Idaho,
the Board of Pharmacy, as well as the DEA; and in that respect, we had no intent of
trying to limit Mr. Byrne's ability to practice. I think that our intent was to try to
meet the Board of Medicine's requirement that we have this agreement, which is a
general outline and the contents of which are not specified by the Board of Medicine.
(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1411-1412, II. 18-4).

In short, both Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne understood that the 2003 DOS Agreement and the Job
Description provided a general outline of the parameters of Mr. Byrne's scope of work, and that the
DOS Agreement in no way precluded Mr. Byrne from providing the care and treatment he gave to
Mrs. Schmechel on September 26, 2003. Further, Dr. Dille testified that he fully approved of Mr.
Byrne's treatment of Mrs. Schmechel and would not have changed the treatment, "I felt [Mr.
Byrne's] care of this patient was totally appropriate and safe." (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1453-1454, 11. 15-2).

5.

Plaintiffs' Own Experts Testified that Defendants Complied with Idaho Law

Plaintiffs argue that the 2003 DOS Agreement placed certain restrictions on Mr. Byrne's
ability to care for and treat Mrs. Schmechel, and that their experts were prepared to testify Mr.
Byrne's care and treatment of Mrs. Schmechel exceeded these restrictions and violated the 2003
/

DOS Agreement. Plaintiffs' argument also fails because plaintiffs' own experts testified that Mr.
Byrne had the authority to perform a history, initial evaluation, determine a treatment plan and
prescribe Mrs. Schmechel medication without first talking to Dr. Dille, and that such authority
complied with Idaho law.
Despite plaintiffs' representation in their brief that their experts were prepared to testify Mr.
Byrne had breached the 2003 DOS Agreement, the actual testimony given by plaintiffs' expert
witnesses is to the contrary.
Specifically, Dr. Lordon testified at trial as follows:
Q:

Let's talk about physicians assistants a little bit. You would agree that a
physician assistant is a physician extender?

A:

I would use that term.

Q:

Physician assistants evaluate and treat patients, and they do minor medical
procedures; correct?

A:

That is correct?

Q:

And that's all appropriate for them to do those things?

A:

Yes, it is.

Q:

It was certainly okay, in your opinion, for Mr. Byrne to prescribe
medications?

A:

Absolutely.

Q:

That's something that Idaho law permits him to do?

A:

Yes.

Q..

And Idaho law also allows physician assistants to evaluate, plan, and
implement plans of care, and you have no problem with that; correct?

A:

I have no problem with that.

Q:

So you are in no way critical of the fact that Mr. Byrne treated Mrs.
Schmechel; correct?

A:

No, none whatsoever.

/

(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 374-375, II. 4-5).
Plaintiffs' expert Mr. Keller testified in his deposition as follows:
Q:

But let me ask you this, it was okay, as I understand it, for Mr. Byrne to make
the decisions as a physician assistant to alter the medication, correct?

A:

Sure. That's by any state regulation and supervisory dictorurn that you have
and the relationship that you have with your supervising physician, a PA has
the authority to do that. Sure.

Q:

You are not critical of him doing that aspect of it?

A:

No, absolutely not.

(Supp.R. Vol. VI, p. 1122, (Depo. Pp. 55-56, 11. 19-3)).
Further, Mr. Keller testified at trial as follows:
Q:

But with respect to what I have up there, a physician assistant, taking medical
histories, conducting physical examinations, prescribing medications,
counseling and educating patients, monitoring patients, ordering diagnostic
tests, performing minor surgery that's all within the scope of a physician
assistant's practice; correct?

A:

Their practice and their education, yes.

(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 479-480, II. 17-1).
Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Arthur Lipman testified in his deposition as follows:
Q:

Is it your contention that Mr. Byrne or Dr. Dille violated any applicable
statute or rule oflaw in the state ofidaho?

A:

No.

(Supp.R. Vol. VI, p. 1131, Depo. p. 137, ll. 3-6).
Plaintiffs could have had their experts opine that defendants failed to meet IDAPA
regulations because they did not have a DOS Agreement in 2003 (based upon the defendants'
mistaken belief as to the existence of a 2003 DOS Agreement until October 2007), that the Job
Description (Ex. 233) for Mr. Byrne plaintiffs had in May 2006 was not in compliance with Idaho
law, and that if the 2004 DOS Agreement was the same as the 2003 DOS Agreement it would have
violated the IDAPA regulations: all of which they did not do. Rather, their experts testified as
indicated above, that Mr. Byrne acted within the scope of his allowable practice as outlined by Idaho
law in his treatment and care of Mrs. Schmechel.

6.

The Timing of the Disclosure of the 2003 DOS Agreement Did Not Preclude
Plaintiffs From Disclosing Expert Testimony Regarding the Scope of Mr.
Byrne's Authority or Whether Defendants Had Complied With Idaho Law

Plaintiffs argue that as a result of the late disclosure of the 2003 DOS Agreement, they were
precluded from disclosing their expert opinion regarding such Agreement. However, this argument
fails, as plaintiffs had access to the IDAP A regulation indicating a DOS Agreement was required, a
copy of the 2004 DOS Agreement and the 200 I Job Description as of May 18, 2006. Plaintiffs
could have had their experts address the IDAPA Regulations and their requirement that a DOS
agreement be in place in 2003 and that if no such DOS agreement existed, defendants were violating
such regulations, or the language of the 2004 Agreement and 2001 Job Description. Plaintiffs failed
to do so. In fact, it appears plaintiffs did not provide these documents to their experts until after they
were deposed in this matter and just prior to trial. (R. Vol. II, pp. 238-242).
Further, plaintiffs could have and should have supplemented their expert disclosures based
upon the 2003 Agreement prior to trial. The parties engaged in supplementation of expert witness
opinions up to the time of trial. In fact, plaintiffs submitted their Fourth Supplemental Expert
Witness Disclosures on October 5, 2007. (Id.) As the Court stated in sustaining the objection to Dr.
Lordon's testimony regarding the 2003 Agreement:
I am going to sustain the objection. I determine that, even though it wasn't disclosed
until last week, that the nature of the inquiry and the circumstances surrounding this
testimony were known in advance sufficiently to allow this disclosure to have been
made. So I will sustain the defendant's objection.
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 344, II. 7-14).

7.

Plaintiffs Waived Their Right to Assert an Error by Failing to Address The
2003 DOS Agreement in Rebuttal Testimony

At trial, the Court indicated it would consider allowing plaintiffs to address issues regarding
the 2003 DOS Agreement on rebuttal. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 421, II. 11-19; see also R. Vol. III, p. 508,
Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, p. 7 (stating that "The court
noted that it would consider allowing such testimony on rebuttal. However, the Schmechels did not
attempt to bring in such evidence on rebuttal.") Plaintiffs did not attempt to address this matter on
rebuttal, and therefore failed to preserve this issue for appeal. By failing to attempt to offer rebuttal
testimony from their experts regarding the 2003 DOS Agreement, the parties cannot know whether
the Court would have allowed such rebuttal testimony. As such, plaintiffs failed to properly raise
this issue at trial, and are precluded from doing so now. See Lankford v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 126
Idaho 187,189,879P.2d1120, 1122 (1994).
In conclusion, plaintiffs are unable to show any irregularities in the proceedings, unfair
surprise, or errors in law with regard to the Court's ruling to preclude plaintiffs' experts from
offering their undisclosed expert opinions regarding the 2003 DOS Agreement. As noted by the
Court, plaintiffs had an opportunity to disclose such opinions prior to trial and failed to do so. The
Court considered this matter based upon all of the available facts, identified the matter was within its
discretion, and appropriately precluded plaintiffs' experts from testifying as to the undisclosed
opinions regarding the 2003 DOS Agreement. Further, plaintiffs waived any such argument by
failing to attempt to address this issue on rebuttal.

B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Allowing Dr. Smith to Testify as to
His Opinions Relating to Causation
Plaintiffs argue the Trial Court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Smith to offer testimony

as to his opinions regarding the cause of Mrs. Schmechel 's death, which were not disclosed until
October 5, 2007. Plaintiffs argue they were prejudiced by the disclosure as they were not afforded a
time to depose Dr. Smith, or find arebuttal expert. However, defendants informed plaintiffs from
the outset of expert discovery that Dr. Smith would offer opinions regarding causation, and that he
would be relying upon the testimony of Dr. Glen Groben and the Twin Falls Coroner's office in
forming those opinions. Defendants seasonably supplemented the expert opinions of Dr. Smith after
he had an opportunity to review the deposition transcript of Ms. Anton, the Twin Falls County
Deputy Coroner. Further, any alleged error in allowing Dr. Smith to offer causation opinion
testimony was harmless, as the jury determined neither Mr. Byrne nor Dr. Dille breached the
applicable standard of care, and therefore never needed to address the question of causation.
1.

The Standard of Review Applicable To The District Court's Decision To Allow
Witness Testimony

The admissibility of expert testimony is an issue within the discretion of the trial court
and cannot be overturned unless there has been an abuse of that discretion. Clark v. Klein, 137
Idaho 154, 45 P.3d 810 (2002).
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(I) provides:
[A] party is under a duty seasonably to supplement the response with respect to any
question directly addressed to ... the identity of each person expected to be called as
an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which the person is expected to
tesstify, and the substance of the person's testimony.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(4) provides that if "a party fails to seasonably
supplement the responses as required in this Rule 26(e), the trial court may exclude the testimony of
witnesses or the admission of evidence not disclosed by a required supplementation of the responses
of the party."

2.

Unlike The Issues Related To Plaintiffs' Experts Addressed In Section IV, A,
Above, Dr. Smith's Causation Opinions Were Seasonably Supplemented

Mr. Byrne originally disclosed Dr. Smith in his June 18, 2007 Disclosure of Expert
Witnesses. (Supp.R. Vol I, pp. 172-174). The Disclosure identified the subject matter upon which
Dr. Smith, a board-certified cardiologist, would be testifying to as "applicable medical principals,
causation, and damages." (/d.)( emphasis added). The June 18, 2007 Disclosure of Expert Witnesses
further indicated:
It is anticipated Dr. Smith will testify that the cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death is
uncertain and that another condition she had was just as, if not more, likely to have
caused her death than Methadone and/or Hydrocodone. In providing this opinion, it
is anticipated Dr. Smith will rely on the descriptions provided regarding the scene of
death and his knowledge of Mrs. Schmechel' s various co-morbid medical conditions
and personal habits. It is also anticipated that Dr. Smith will testify regarding Mrs.
Schmechel's reduced life expectancy given her medical condition and personal
habits.
Dr. Smith will also be called to rebut the testimony of plaintiffs' experts to the extent
it involves Mrs. Schmechel's cause of death and her life expectancy.

It is anticipated Dr. Smith's deposition will be taken in this case and it is anticipated
he will testify at trial regarding what is discussed in his deposition.
(/d.)(Emphasis added).
On June 20, 2007, counsel for the parties discussed scheduling depositions of experts and
counsel for Mr. Byrne sent a letter to plaintiffs' counsel indicating in part, that Dr. Smith could be

deposed only after the deposition of Dr. Groben. (Supp.R. Vol. VI, pp. 1133-1134). Dr. Groben
performed the autopsy of Mrs. Schmechel. Scheduling of depositions was difficult, and on July 3,
2007, counsel for Mr. Byrne again wrote to plaintiffs' counsel attempting to schedule depositions of
experts and Dr. Groben, and again indicated that Dr. Smith would not be made available to testify
until "the pathologist in this case, Dr. Groben is deposed." (Supp.R. Vol. VI, pp. 1137-1139). The
July 3, 2007 Ietter went on to state efforts were being made to schedule Dr. Groben's deposition, and
if Dr. Groben could be deposed during the week of July 30, 2007, that Dr. Smith would be made
available for deposition on August 16, 2007. (Id.) On July 6, 2007, counsel for Mr. Byrne sent a
letter to plaintiffs' counsel indicating Dr. Groben was available for deposition on July 30, 2007, and
Dr. Smith could be deposed on August 16, 2007. (Supp.R. Vol. VI, p. 1142)). Dr. Groben was
deposed on July 31, 2007.
On July 27, 2007, four days before Dr. Groben was deposed, plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter
to defense counsel stating "On further consideration, we will not be taking the depositions or (sic)
your respective experts. Therefore, please cancel the deposition dates for those individuals."
(Supp.R. Vol. VI, p. 1145). Therefore, despite the knowledge that Dr. Smith would be testifying
regarding causation and relying upon the deposition testimony of Dr. Groben, plaintiffs' counsel
determined they would not depose Dr. Smith, or any of defendants' respective experts in this case.
Defendants faced difficulties in scheduling Ms. Anton's deposition.

Ms. Anton was

originally scheduled for deposition on July 10, 2007. (Supp.R. Vol. VI, pp. 1151-1153). On June 7,
2007, an assistant from plaintiffs' counsel's office called indicating plaintiffs' counsel was not
available for the July 10, 2007 deposition of Ms. Anton. (Supp.R. Vol. VI, pp. 1155). Counsel for

Mr. Byrne attempted to obtain dates from plaintiffs' counsel to reschedule Ms. Anton's deposition in
late June 2007. (Id p. 1157). Due to unavailability of Ms. Anton and Dennis Chambers (another
Twin Falls County Coroner who was to be deposed), Mr. Byrne was unable to get another available
date for Ms. Anton until September 5, 2007. Ms. Anton was deposed on September 5, 2007. (Id. p.
1160). Although Mr. Byrne had obtained records from Ms. Anton, it was not until her deposition,
that her opinion that Mrs. Schmechel was awake when she died came to light. Specifically, Ms.
Anton testified in her deposition that in her opinion Mrs. Schmechel was awake just prior to her
death based on numerous factors, including that the television was on, a burned out cigarette was
found at Mrs. Schmechel' s feet, and it appeared she was sitting up at the time of her death. (Id p.
1161, Depo. pp. 42-44, ll. 15-13). Counsel received Ms. Anton's deposition transcript on
September 24, 2007. (Supp.R. Vol. VI, pp. 1103-1104). On September 26, 2007, Ms. Anton's
deposition transcript was hand delivered to Dr. Smith for his review and consideration. (Id. p. 1108).
On October 5, 2007, after Dr. Smith had an opportunity to review the Anton deposition,
defendants filed a supplemental disclosure of Dr. Smith's opinions, which included additional detail
with respect to Dr. Smith's opinion as to causation. (R. Vol. II, pp. 228-237):
It is anticipated that Dr. Smith will testify that, on a more probable than not basis, the
likely cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death was a cardiac death, likely a fatal
dysrhythmia. He will testify that the dysrhythmia was caused by her underlying
cardiac and other co-morbid conditions.
In addition to relying on all materials previously identified in Mr. Byrne's original
Disclosure of Expert Witnesses related to Dr. Smith, and identified in this
supplemental disclosure, Dr. Smith relies on the deposition of Dr. Glen Groben,
M.D.; Dr. Groben's autopsy report and toxicology report; the deposition testimony of
Shaiyenne Anton and Coroner's records and notes, as well as those of the Sherri ff' s
office; death scene photographs, and descriptions of the death scene.

Dr. Smith believes the evidence indicates that Mrs. Schmechel suffered a fatal
cardiac dysrhythmia while awake sitting up on her couch. He believes that she had a
number of underlying co-morbid conditions which likely contributed to this fatal
cardiac death. These would include her cardiomegaly, high blood pressure, history
of smoking, and smoking at the time of death, her documented obesity, and her
significant narrowing of the coronary arteries. In addition, Dr. Smith will testify that
had Mrs. Schmechel not passed away when she did, and if, in fact, her death was
attributable to medications she was taking, rather than her underlying co-morbid
condition, epidemiologic research, and specific findings of co-morbid risk factors,
suggest Mrs. Schmechel' s life expectancy was less than ten years from the time she
died. To reach this conclusion, Dr. Smith relied upon the autopsy report and findings
of co-morbid conditions, as well as the documented history of elevated cholesterol
and triglycerides, elevated blood pressure, evidence of the hypertensive kidney
damage, the significant stenosis of the major coronary arteries, and her obstructive
sleep apnea. Other factors include Mrs. Schmechel' s history of smoking and failure
to discontinue smoking despite repeated warnings and suggestions to do so, her
obesity, her chronic use of narcotics, Bextra, and other medications, as well as other
factors identified on autopsy, in depositions, and the medical records.

(Id.)
As testified to by Dr. Smith during trial, the deposition testimony of Ms. Anton was critical
to him in forming his opinions as to causation:
Q:

But Ms. Anton, or Ms. Shindle, was her deposition critical to your opinions
in this case?

A:

It was. I think her deposition as well as the pictures and the other
information I gained from reading those depositions and looking at the
photos were very important.

Q:

And why was the coroner's deposition so important to you?

A:

I think the - what I learned from that, it appeared as though Mrs. Schmechel
had suffered a sudden death and that it happened abruptly, and that when you
have sudden death, almost all of those - when I say almost all, 80 to 90
percent of them-are going to be cardiac in origin.

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 1591, 11. 6-21).

Ms. Anton's testimony was also important because it was her, and not Dr. Groben, who
determined the manner of death; specifically, Dr. Groben testified:
Q:

And it's true, is it not, that actually you don't determine the manner of death?

A:

No, I do--not, well, on this case, I don't. Depends on where it comes from.

Q:

That would be in the coroner's office, in this case Ms. Now Anton, then
Shindle?

A:

Right. That's correct.

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 956, II. 17-25).
Therefore, as of October 4, 2007, plaintiffs were fully aware of Dr. Smith's anticipated
testimony regarding the cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death. Further, prior to such time, and prior to
plaintiffs' determination to not depose defendants' experts, plaintiffs were aware that Dr. Smith
would be relying upon the depositions of Dr. Groben and Ms. Anton in formulating his opinions as
to causation and that he would be rebutting any opinions by plaintiffs' experts as to causation.
Plaintiffs rely on Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006) for the proposition
that defendants' disclosure of Dr. Smith's causation opinion was not seasonably supplemented
quoting the following language, "(w)hile a court may properly order parties to disclose expert
witnesses by a deadline, a brief order dictating the date of disclosing only the names of expert
witnesses cannot trump the requirement ofl.R.C.P. 26(e)(I )(B) that parties seasonably supplement
their discovery responses as new information is learned or expert opinions change." (emphasis
added). As discussed above, and correctly recognized by the Trial Court in its denial of the Motion
for New Trial, the instant situation is clearly distinguishable from Edmunds. In Edmunds, the Court

affirmed the trial court's exclusion of an untimely disclosed expert, and overturned the trial court's
exclusion of a timely disclosed expert's supplemental opinions. Ms. Anton's opinion that Mrs.
Schmechel was awake just prior to her death was new information that could not be obtained until
Ms. Anton was deposed. Ms. Anton's deposition was delayed in large part upon plaintiffs' counsel
and Ms. Anton's schedules and not the fault of defendants. Further, once the new information was
obtained, it was immediately sent to Dr. Smith for his review and the supplementation to his
causation opinion was promptly disclosed.
Plaintiffs further rely on McKim v. Horner, 143 Idaho 568, 149 P.3d 843 (2006) for support
of their argument the Trial Court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Smith to testify. In McKim,
the plaintiff and the defendant were in an auto accident and had apparently agreed the accident was
low-impact. Id. 143 Idaho at 570, 149 P.3d at 845. However, less than two weeks prior to trial and
well after the disclosure deadline for lay witnesses, the plaintiff produced an affidavit of an alleged
eye witness who was going to testify she had seen the accident from her home and that defendant
was driving at a high speed at the time of the accident. Id. The defendant moved in limine to
exclude the untimely disclosed lay witness. The trial court excluded the witness from testifying
based upon the plaintiffs "failure to investigate potential witnesses and her late disclosure" of the
witness. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff admitted they "did not canvas the neighborhood" for potential
witnesses. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho determined the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the witness.
McKim is distinguishable on numerous grounds. First, unlike in McKim, defendants timely

disclosed Dr. Smith and indicated as described above, in their initial June 2007 disclosure that he

may be called at trial to render opinions regarding causation. Further, Mr. Byrne did not delay in
obtaining the depositions of Dr. Groben or Ms. Anton or in any way fail to investigate the matter.
Rather, based on plaintiffs' counsels' and Ms. Anton's schedule, the deposition of Ms. Anton could
not occur until early September 2007.
Finally, Dr. Smith's disclosure came 11 days prior to trial, therefore, plaintiffs still had an
opportunity to depose Dr. Smith and could have made efforts to rebut Dr. Smith's opinions.
However, plaintiffs failed to do so and did not request time to rebut Dr. Smith's opinions.
Based on the above, the Trial Court's decision to allow Dr. Smith to testify was not an abuse
of discretion.

3.

Plaintiffs Cannot Show Any Prejudice From Dr. Smith's Causation Opinion
Testimony As The Jury Did Not Reach The Issue of Causation

Dr. Smith's opinions were seasonably supplemented and the Trial Court's decision to allow
him to testify regarding his supplemented opinions regarding causation was not an abuse of
discretion. However, even in the event this Court were to find such decision was an error, such error
was harmless, as the objected to testimony went only to causation, and it was unnecessary for the
jury to address such question after it unanimously found that neither Mr. Byrne nor Dr. Dille
breached the standard of care.
As recognized by this Court in a previous case, "[i]n the case of an incorrect ruling regarding
evidence, however, a new trial is merited only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the
parties." White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882,892, 104 P.3d 356,366 (2004). In the instant matter, Dr.
Smith's objected to testimony related solely to the issue of causation. Dr. Smith provided no

testimony with regard to the applicable standard of care. The jury in the instant matter was not
required to even consider the issue of causation, as they unanimously found that neither Mr. Byrne
nor Dr. Dille breached the applicable standard of care. (R. Vol. III, p. 444). Therefore, even if the
Trial Court's decision to allow Dr. Smith's testimony was in error, such error was harmless. See

also Kalams v. Giacchetto, 842 A.2d 1100 (Conn. 2004). In Kalams, plaintiff brought a medical
malpractice action against Dr. Giacchetto. The trial court precluded one of plaintiff's experts from
offering testimony regarding causation by granting a motion in limine. (Id. 842, A.2d at 1103). The
jury held in favor of Dr. Giacchetto, finding he did not breach the standard of care. (Id. 842 A.2d at
1105). On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut determined it "need not consider the merits of
the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine because, even if we assume that the ruling was
improper, it was harmless. The jury was not required to reach the issue of causation because, as
evidenced by its answers to the jury interrogatories, it first determined that the defendant had not
breached the standard of care." Id.
C.

The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Excluding the IDAP A Regulations from
Evidence or in Not Giving Plaintiffs' Requested Negligence Per Se Instruction

I.

Standard of Review

When reviewing a trial court's evidentiary rulings the Supreme Court ofldaho "applies an
abuse of discretion standard." Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 134, 191 P.3d 205, 212
(2008). The appellants have the burden of showing the Trial Court abused its discretion in excluding
the IDAPA Regulations from evidence. Id.
When reviewing jury instructions on appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho "review the
instructions and ascertain whether the instructions when considered as a whole, fairly and adequately
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present the issues and state the applicable law." Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho
892, __, 188 P.3d 834,838 (2008) quoting Ricketts v. Eastern Idaho Equip., Co., Inc., 137 Idaho
578, 581, 51 P.3d 392, 395 (2002). "If the instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and
state the law, no reversible error is conunitted." Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho
330,343,986 P.2d 996, 1009 (1999).

"[T]he standard of review of whether a jury instruction

should or should not have been given, is whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction."
Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 750, 86 P.3d 458, 464 (2004).

"Negligence per se, which results from the violation of a specific requirement of law or
ordinance, is a question oflaw, over which this Court exercises free review." Obendorf, 145 Idaho
at 897, 188 P.3d at 839 quoting O 'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 51, 122 Pl3d 308,310
(2002). Similarly, the determination of whether a duty exists is generally a matter of law, over
which this Court exercises free review. Obendorf, 145 Idaho at 897, 188 P.3d at 839.
2.

The IDAPA Regulations Do Not Give Rise to Negligence Per Se

Plaintiffs argue the Court erred in failing to give their proposed jury instruction regarding
negligence per se based upon an alleged violation of the IDAPA regulations and erred in not
admitting such regulations as exhibits. Negligence per se results from the "violation of a specific
requirement oflaw or ordinance." Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393,395, 34 P.3d I 076, I 078 (2001) A
claim of negligence per se requires plaintiffs to prove: (I) the statute or regulation clearly defines the
standard of conduct; (2) the statute or regulation was intended to prevent the harm caused by
defendant's act or omission; (3) plaintiff is a person of the class the statute or regulation was
designed to protect; and (4) the violation must be a proximate cause of plaintiffs alleged injury.

O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d 308, 311 (2005). In the instant action, the

IDAPA Regulations fail to meet the first or fourth elements and therefore cannot give rise to
negligence per se.
The IDAPA Regulations failed to define a clear standard of conduct and because plaintiffs
cannot show a breach of such regulations proximately caused Mrs. Schmechel's death, such
regulations do not give rise to a negligence per se instruction.

Further, a negligence per se

instruction in a medical malpractice action is improper as Idaho Code § 6- l 0 l 2 requires as an
essential element that plaintiffs "affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony ... that [the]
defendant ... negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice."
In addition, the Court allowed plaintiffs' counsel to question defendants regarding the
regulations, read portions of the regulations and to show portions of the regulations to the jury during
such examinations. As such, plaintiffs cannot show that exclusion of the IDAPA regulations
affected a substantial right.
a.

The IDAPA Regulations do not clearly define a standard of conduct.

In the instant action, plaintiffs claim IDAPA § 22.01.03.000 (2003) "provides an
unambiguous description of the required standard of conduct for a physician assistant in Idaho."
However, a close review of the case law relied on by plaintiffs reveals such cases are distinguishable
because the ID APA Regulations are ambiguous, subject to interpretation and do not clearly define a
standard of conduct as required for negligence per se.
In Oberdorf, the plaintiffs were asparagus farm owners who sued the defendants for crop
damages resulting from application of pesticides to their fields. The plaintiffs sought and the court

gave an instruction on negligence per se with regard to Idaho Code § 22-3420(1) and (2), which
provided:
PROHIBITED ACTS. No person shall:
(!) Use a pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling except as provided for
by rule.

(2) Make pesticide recommendations in a manner inconsistent with its labeling
except as provided for by rule.
The defendants argued the above statute was ambiguous based upon the "except as provided
for by rule" language. Oberdorf, 145, Idaho at 899, 188 P.3d at 841. The Oberdorftrial court gave
a negligence per se instruction and on appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the decision,
stating the "statute clearly defines a standard of conduct: no person may use a pesticide or make
recommendations for use of a pesticide that is inconsistent with its labeling, except as provided for
by rule." Id.
Similarly in Sanchez v. Galey, the Supreme Court of Idaho determined that OSHA
regulations were "clear and explicit" and could give rise to negligence per se. 112 Idaho 609,617,
733 P.2d 1234, 1242. The regulations at issue in Sanchez clearly outlined a standard of conduct:
At the time of their initial employment and at least annually thereafter the employer
shall instruct every employee in the safe operation and servicing of all equipment
with which the employee will be involved, and at least the following safe operating
practices should be covered:
1.

stop engine, disconnect the power source and wait for all machine
movement to stop before cleaning or unclogging the equipment;

2.

make sure everyone is clear of the machine before starting the engine,
engaging power or operating the machine.

/

The second regulation stated:
Whenever a moving machinery part presents a hazard during serv1cmg or
maintenance, the engine shall be stopped, the power source disconnected, and all
machine movement stopped before servicing or maintenance is performed.

Id. 112 Idaho at 616, 733 P.2d at 1241.
Both Obendorfand Sanchez involved statutes and regulations that provided clearly defined
standards of conduct. As discussed below, the ID APA Regulations fail to provide such clear and
concise standards of conduct. Rather, the IDAPA regulations are more akin to the statute considered
by this Court in Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 34 P.3d 1076 (2001), because they are subject to
interpretation and fail to clearly define a standard of conduct. In Ahles, the district court held that
the defendant was negligent per se for violation ofidaho Code.§ 49-633 for passing the plaintiffs
vehicle on the right side and a subsequent collision. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho
addressed each of the four requirements of negligence per se and determined that the statute did not
allow for negligence per se. The Ahles court found that elements 2 and 3 were met as the statute was
intended to protect motorists and plaintiff fell within the protected category. However, the court
held that "the standard of conduct described in Idaho Code. § 49-633, ... is far from clear and
requires statutory interpretation including consideration of problematic definitions of terms used in
the statute." Id. 136 Idaho at 396, 34 P.3d at 1079. The Ahles court held there were numerous
questions as to certain terms in the statute that were subject to interpretation, and that"[a ]11 of these
questions add to the complexity of the statute and show that the standard of conduct derived from
interpreting the statute is less than clear and not easily ascertained or applied." Id. As such, the

Ahles court held that LC. § 49-633 did not satisfy the test with regard to the "description of a clear

/

standard of conduct. Accordingly, the alleged violation of the statute in this case cannot be deemed
negligence per se." Id.
In the instant action, as in Ahles with respect to the statutes involved there, the relevant
portions of the IDAPA Regulations fail to clearly describe a standard of conduct:
Idaho Administrative Code § 22.0 I .03.028 SCOPE OF PRACTICE states in relevant part:
01.
Physical Examination. A physician assistant may evaluate the
physical and psychosocial health status through a comprehensive health history and
physical examination. This may include the performance of pelvic examinations and
pap smears; and
02.
Screening And Evaluating. Initiate appropriate laboratory or
diagnostic studies, or both, to screen or evaluate the patient health status and interpret
reported information in accordance with knowledge of the laboratory or diagnostic
studies, provided such laboratory or diagnostic studies are related to and consistent
with the physician assistant's scope of practice.
03.

Minor Illness. Diagnose and manage minor illnesses or conditions.

04.
Manage Care. Manage the health care of the stable chronically ill
patient in accordance with the medical regiment initiated by the supervising
physician.
The ID APA Regulations do not provide any guidance as to the meaning of: a minor illness or
condition; a major illness or condition; stable chronically ill patient; or what constitutes managing
care. As such, what constitutes a minor or major illness or condition is ambiguous and left to
interpretation. In addition what constitutes managed care of a stable chronically ill patient is left to
interpretation. If Mrs. Schrnechel's chronic pain was a minor illness (as testified to by Mr. Byrne at
Tr. Vol. II, p. 1364, II. 15-19) the Regulations would allow Mr. Byrne to diagnose and manage such
condition.

Plaintiffs argue on appeal that a jury should be allowed to determine the meaning of the
terms "minor illness" or "major illness" or "manage" with regard to the IDAPA Regulations, stating
they are "rudimentary terms." (Appellants' Brief, p. 28). Plaintiffs compare the above medical
terms to the phrase "safe operation" which was a part of the OSHA regulation that gave rise to a
negligence per se instruction in Sanchez. Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho at 616, 733 P.2d at 1241.
Plaintiffs assert that the regulation at issue in Sanchez failed to explicitly define the phrase "safe
operation" and the Court still determined it clearly outlined a standard of conduct. In Sanchez, an
employee of the defendant company was unclogging a potato harvester while the harvester was still
running which resulted in the severing of his hand and fingers. Id. 112 Idaho at 611-612, 733 P.2d
at 1235-1236. Although the term "safe operation" may have been ambiguous, the regulatiop at issue
went on to define "two safe operating practices" which included the exact situation at issue in

Sanchez-unclogging a machine while the machine is operating and while the machine movement
has not stopped. Therefore, although a "safe operation" may be a somewhat ambiguous term, the
regulation at issue in Sanchez actually defined a standard of conduct that applied to the exact
situation at issue in that case.
Plaintiffs next argue Dr. Vorse testified Mrs. Schmechel "was a very complex patient for
which a physician assistant is not authorized, pursuant to the IDAPA regulations, to treat."
(Appellants' Brief, p. 28, referring to Tr. Vol. I, p. 508). A review of Dr. Vorse's testimony reveals
that although she described Mrs. Schmechel as a complex patient, she never testified that Mr. Byrne
was not qualified to treat her pain issues. In fact, at no time did any of plaintiffs' witnesses,
including Dr. Vorse, or plaintiffs' expert witnesses, including doctors Lordon and Lipman testify
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that Mr. Byrne could not care for and treat Mrs. Schmechel. Dr. Vorse treated Mrs. Schmechel from
1996 through the September 2003 for pain management and sleep apnea. At trial, counsel for
plaintiffs asked Dr. Vorse if Mrs. Schmechel was "a complex patient" to which Dr. Vorse responded,
"Yes. I mean she was." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 508, II. 12-14). Dr. Vorse then went on to explain what
conditions made Mrs. Schmechel a "complex" patient, which included: the nature of arachnoiditis,
the scarring of her nerve roots and the cysts formed around her spinal cord; knee problems including
a large baker's cyst; back problems; sleep apnea; infected teeth; obesity and Mrs. Schmechel was a
very physically active person. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 507-512). Mr. Byrne was only treating Mrs.
Schmechel' s pain, and not her numerous other conditions. Plaintiffs' arguments do nothing but
further establish the ambiguity contained within the IDAPA Regulations. Specif~ally, what is a
major or a minor illness? Does it have to do with the severity of the illness itself, the type of illness,
or the illness combined with other conditions?3 The IDAPA Regulations are unclear. Further, it is
important to note that Dr. Vorse did not testify that Mr. Byrne was precluded from providing care
and treatment to Mrs. Schmechel.
In ruling on plaintiffs' negligence per se instruction the Trial Court correctly recognized that
the IDAPA Regulations failed to outlined a clear standard of conduct, "I conclude that the IDAPA
regulations are not in and of themselves clear and precise enough to allow me to give a negligence
per instruction on them." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 1886, II. 21-24).

3

The Trial Court stated: "I conclude that the IDAPA regulations are not in and of themselves
clear and precise enough to allow me to give a negligence per [sic] instruction on them." (Tr.
Vol. II, pp. 1887, II. 21-24). The Court then noted the IDAPA Regulations do not "meet the
threshold hurdle of being clearly defining a standard of conduct." (Id., at p. I 889, II. 2-3).
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b.

Plaintifft cannot show that a violation ofthe IDAPA Regulations proximately
caused Mrs. Schmechel 's death.

In addition to failing to provide a clear and defined standard of conduct, the IDAPA
Regulations cannot give rise to a negligence per se instruction as plaintiffs cannot establish that the
alleged failure to comply with the regulations proximately caused Mrs. Schmechel's death.
As stated above, the fourth element required to find that violation of a statute or regulation
equates to negligence per se is that "the violation must have been the proximate cause of the injury."

Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P.3d at I 078. Plaintiffs cannot meet this requirement as Dr. Dille
testified in both his deposition and at trial, that with regard to Mr. Byrne's treatment of Mrs.
Schmechel, he "could not see where [he] would have made any changes or done anything different
/

than what Mr. Byrne had." (Supp.R. Vol. VI, p. 1164, Depo. p. 29, 11. 17-21). Dr. Dille testified at
trial that if anything, he would not have been as conservative as Mr. Byrne in his Methadone dosing
'·

of Mrs. Schmechel. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 1408-1409, ll. 2-1). Because Dr. Dille would not have changed
the treatment provided by Mr. Byrne to Mrs. Schmechel, whether Dr. Dille or Mr. Byrne "managed"
Mrs. Schmechel' s condition is irrelevant. Therefore, plaintiffs are unable to establish that any
alleged breach of the Regulations was the proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel' s death, and the
IDAPA Regulations cannot give rise to a negligence per se instruction.

3.

A Negligence Per Se Instruction Is Improper In A Medical Malpractice Action

Idaho law specifically requires that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action "must, as an
essential part of his or her case in chief, affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony and by a
preponderance of all the competent evidence, that [the] defendant ... negligently failed to meet the
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applicable standard of health care practice." Idaho Code. § 6-1012. Allowing plaintiffs to establish
breach via negligence per se in relation to the IDAPA Regulations would violate the requirement of
establishing the standard and a breach by expert testimony.
The Idaho appellate courts have not addressed the issue of whether negligence per se may be
appropriate with regard to medical malpractice actions. However, it has rejected other similar
common law theories that would ignore the statutory requirement of direct expert testimony. For
example, in Kolln v. Saint Luke's Reg'[ Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,334, 940 P.2d 1142, ll53 (1997)
this Court explicitly held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor does not apply in Idaho to medical
malpractice actions given Idaho Code § 6-1012 and 6-1013 's expert testimony requirements. Kolin,
supports the argument that negligence per se also does not apply in a JJ!alpractice action in Idaho.
Both res ipsa loquitor and negligence per se are common law negligence doctrines that are
supplanted by Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013's expert testimony'requirements for establishing
medical negligence in Idaho. See also Shelton v. Sargent, 144 S. W.3d 113, 122 (Tex.App.
2004)(holding that "[i]n a medical malpractice case, the plaintiffbears the burden of proving that the
health care provider undertook a mode or form of treatment that a reasonable and prudent member of
the medical profession would not have undertaken under the same or similar circumstances ... they
cannot circumvent the requirement of expert testimony by merely substituting evidence of violation
of a statute.").
Plaintiffs should not be allowed to circumvent the requirements of establishing the applicable
local standard of care, and a breach thereof, through expert testimony, by showing an alleged breach
of the IDAPA Regulations.
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4.

The Court Did Not Err In Excluding the IDAPA Regulations From Evidence

Trial courts have "broad discretion in the admission of evidence at trial, and (their] decision
to admit such evidence will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion."
Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,564, 97 P.3d 428,431 (2004).

In ruling on the admissibility of

the Regulations, the Trial Court noted that they were not clear enough to give rise to a per se jury
instruction. Further, as made clear throughout the trial, the Regulations themselves were confusing
and ambiguous and would likely have misled the jury had they been admitted into evidence. As
such, the Court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the Regulations from evidence.
Even if such ruling was in error, plaintiffs are not entitled to a new trial as they are unable to
establish such ruling affected a substantial right or that they incurred any unfair prejudice.
Specifically, the Court took judicial notice of the IDAPA Regulations, allowed plaintiffs' counsel to
question defendants regarding the Regulations, read portions ofthe regulations, and show portions of
the Regulations to the Jury during examination of witnesses. Further, the Court indicated it would
allow plaintiffs to use the Regulations during closing argument. As the Fifth Circuit noted in
Alexander v. Conveyors & Dumpers, Inc, when a party is allowed to read a safety code to the jury

and question witnesses with the document the complaining party does not suffer any prejudice
because it was not provided to the jury. Alexander v. Conveyors & Dumpers, Inc., 731 F.2d 1221,
1229 (5th Cir. Miss. 1984) (finding that "no substantial right of Alexander's was affected by the
failure to admit the Code as an exhibit because the relevant sections had already been read and
shown to the jury.")
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D.

The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Bifurcating the Recklessness Issue
During trial, plaintiffs requested the Trial Court give a jury instruction defining reckless

conduct prior to deliberation. (R. Vol. II, pp. 343, 346-349). Defendants objected to the language of
the instruction as well as to the Court giving a reckless jury instruction prior to a determination by
the jury awarding damages in excess of the statutory cap for non-economic damages. (R. Vol. II, pp.
364-379). The Trial Court correctly determined it would not give a reckless jury instruction unless
and until the jury returned a verdict including damages in excess of the statutory non-economic
damages cap. The Jury returned a verdict finding defendants did not breach the standard of care, and
therefore, the Court did not give the reckless instruction.

1.

Standard of Review

As noted above, when reviewing jury instructions on appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho
"review the instructions and ascertain whether the instructions when considered as a whole, fairly
and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law." Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co.,
Inc., 145 Idaho 892. 188 P.3d 834,838 (2008) quoting Ricketts v. Eastern Idaho Equip., Co., Inc.,

137 Idaho 578,581, 51 P.3d 392,395 (2002). "If the instructions fairly and adequately present the
issues and state the Jaw, no reversible error is committed." Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133
Idaho 330, 343, 986 P.2d 996, 1009 (1999). "[T]he standard ofreview of whether a jury instruction
should or should not have been given, is whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction."
Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 750, 86 P.3d 458, 464 (2004). The appellant has the burden to

clearly show prejudicial error from an erroneous jury instruction. Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539,
543, 164 P.3d 819,823 (2007).
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2.

The Court Did Not Err In Bifurcating The Issue Of Recklessness

Plaintiffs argue the Trial Court's bifurcation of the issue of recklessness confused and/or
misled the jury, "was tantamount to the Court commenting on the evidence" and unfairly hindered
plaintiffs "in their ability to argue to the jury the extent to which the Respondents' conduct was
below the standard of care." (See Appellants' Brief, p. 34). However, as discussed below, the Trial
Court's decision to bifurcate recklessness was appropriate based upon the fact that recklessness in
the instant action would only be relevant if the Jury had awarded damages in excess of the statutory
cap. Regardless, even if it was determined the bifurcation was error, such error was harmless, as the
jury determined defendants did not breach the standard of care.
Plaintiffs' argument that the jury could hav7 found recklessness without finding negligence
defies common sense as well as the state of the law. The face of plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction
even makes it clear "reckless" conduct is conduct bearing a higher degree of culpability than
negligent conduct. Plaintiffs' proposed instruction on recklessness states in pertinent part, "The
words "reckless conduct" when used in these instructions and when applied to the allegations in this
case, mean more than ordinary negligence." (R. Vol. 3, p. 343).
Under plaintiffs' own definition of recklessness, if Mr. Byrne was not negligent, he could not
be reckless. Many Idaho cases recognize the distinction between "negligence" and "recklessness."

See e.g. Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 128 P.3d 897, 902 (2005); Galloway v. Walker 140
Idaho 672, 676, 99 P.3d 625, 629 (Ct. App. 2004). Black's Law Dictionary recognizes the fact
. recklessness embraces a higher standard than negligence and states in its definition of recklessness

that, "Recklessness involves a greater degree of fault than negligence but a lesser degree of fault than
intentional wrongdoing." Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed. (West 1999).
Plaintiffs' argument makes even less sense when considered in light ofldaho Code Sections
6-1012 and 6-1013, which govern medical malpractice claims. These sections require plaintiffs "[i]n
any case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or death of any person ... on account of the
provision of or failure to provide health care or on account of any matter incidental or related
thereto" to prove through direct expert testimony that the defendant "negligently failed to meet the
applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which such care allegedly was or
should have been provided ... " (Emphasis added). Under these sections therefore, plaintiffs had to
prove negligence to recover for medical/ malpractice, and their argument that a finding of
recklessness without negligence could have been sufficient must be rejected.
,

Plaintiffs sought to instruct the jury'on recklessness so they had a basis to pierce the statutory
non-economic damages cap ofldaho Code § 6-1603. The statutory non-economic damage cap was
only relevant if the jury found that defendants breached the standard of care, that such breaches were
a proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death, and awarded non-economic damages in excess of the
cap. In fact, the statute specifically provides the jury should not be informed of the cap during its
deliberations. See LC.§ 6-1603(3) "(If a case is tried to a jury, the jury shall not be informed of the
limitation contained in subsection(!) of this section.").
The Trial Court's bifurcation of the recklessness issue is not the "equivalent to forcing the
Jury to disregard relevant evidence presented during trial." (Appellants' Brief, p. 36). The jury was
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certainly allowed to, and did consider the testimony of Dr. Lipman regarding recklessness in
considering whether Mr. Byrne was negligent.
Whether defendants were reckless could only be relevant for purposes of avoiding the
statutory cap on non-economic damages. Therefore, until the jury determined a breach of the
standard of care occurred, and that such breach was a proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death,
and that non-economic damages exceeded the cap, the issue of recklessness was not relevant. As
such, the instructions, as given, adequately presented the relevant issues to the jury and stated the
applicable law.

V.

CONCLUSION

As described above, plaintiff/, have failed to demonstrate the District Court abused its
discretion as to any of its rulings or decisions. Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the
decisions of the District Court shoul'd be affirmed.
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